Key establishment protocols are among the most important security mechanisms via which two or more parties can generate a common session key to in order to encrypt their communications over an otherwise insecure network. This paper is concerned with the vulnerability of one-pass two-party key establishment protocols to key-compromise impersonation (K-CI) attacks. The latter may occur once an adversary has obtained the long-term private key of an honest party, and represents a serious -but often underestimated -threat. This is because an entity may not be aware that her computer has been compromised and her private key is exposed, and because a successful impersonation attack may result in far greater harm than the reading of past and future conversations. Our aim is to describe two main classes of K-CI attacks that can be mounted against all of the best-known one-pass protocols, including MQV and HMQV. We show that one of the attacks described can be somewhat avoided (though not completely eliminated) through the combined use of digital signatures and time-stamps; however, there still remains a class of K-CI threats for which there is no obvious solution.
INTRODUCTION
In order for two parties to communicate securely over an unreliable public network, they must be able to authenticate one another and agree on a secret encryption key. To achieve this, key establishment protocols are used at the start of a communication session in order to verify the parties' identities and establish a common session key. There are two basic categories of protocols (Blake-Wilson and . The first includes so-called key transport protocols, in which the session key is created by one entity and is securely transmitted to the other. A second category includes key agreement protocols, where information from both entities is used to derive the shared secret key. A protocol is said to be symmetric if both entities a-priori possess some common secret data, and asymmetric if the two entities share only authenticated public information such as a public key with a digital certificate.
Since the introduction of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange (Diffie and Hellman, 1976) , there has been a large number of key establishment protocols proposed, including recent one-round (Jeong et al., 2004; Law et al., 1998) , two-round (Bird et al., 1991; Lu et al., 2005) and three-round approaches (BlakeWilson and Menezes, 1998; Boyd et al., 2004; Kwon, 2001) . Some of the disadvantages of these protocols are their high computational and communication cost which, combined with their round complexity, make them unsuitable for use in one-way communication channels. At the same time, there are a variety of applications that require low-cost one-way channel communication. Some of the best-known examples include e-mail and SMS, where the receiver cannot immediately reply, store-and-forward applications (e.g., printers) where messages are sent to resources which need not reply at all, and secure key exchange in mobile environments where low communication cost is critical.
To satisfy these requirements, efficient scalable one-pass key establishment protocols have been developed recently (Law et al., 1998; Krawczyk, 2005) . In those schemes, only one of the parties transmits information in order to create the session key (but does not transmit the key itself). This means that one-pass approaches lie somewhere between the key transport and key agreement categories 1 . Furthermore, most, if not all, have been derived from modifications of preexisting x-round protocols.
Almost all one-pass approaches belong to the category of authenticated key establishment (AK) protocols, because they provide implicit key authentication (IKA), meaning that the two (uncorrupted) parties using the protocol are assured that no one else can possibly learn the value of their session key. On the other hand, one-pass protocols cannot achieve known key security (K-KS) because an adversary can simply replay a previous protocol run that he has managed to record; nor can they provide perfect forward secrecy (PFS) because there can be no protocol for implicit authentication that achieves PFS with two or fewer messages (Krawczyk, 2005) . Finally, one-pass approaches are prone to key-compromise impersonation (K-CI) attacks, in a number of ways which will be discussed shortly.
Arguably, protocol designers are often more concerned with PFS, and seem to ignore K-CI (Strangio, 2006) . However, K-CI can potentially have more serious consequences: besides reading past or future conversations, an attacker would also be able to elicit additional information that may never have been communicated otherwise, by masquerading as a different honest principal. Because of this, it is our opinion that more emphasis should be given on a protocol being K-CI-resistant. In this paper, we discuss and demonstrate a series of impersonation attacks that affect one-pass key establishment protocols, after a keycompromise has occurred. We also examine the use of time-stamps and standard digital signatures for the purpose of withstanding certain types of K-CI attacks. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first detailed study of such attacks on one-pass key establishment protocols.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we fix notation and review some required definitions. Section 3 describes some of the best known one-pass two-party key establishment protocols. Section 4 discusses the K-CI vulnerability vis-a-vis a series of important and widely-used applications, and describes two basic types of K-CI attacks and possible responses.
NOTATION AND PRIMITIVES
The protocols described in the next Section can be defined over any finite commutative group G of order n, that comes equipped with a difficult discrete logarithm problem. Throughout this paper we consider asymmetric protocols based on elliptic curve cryptosystems (G will be the group of points on an elliptic curve), and we will use additive representation for group operations (Kaliski, 2001 ). We will let P denote a generator of G, and will assume that G, P and n are fixed and known in advance to the parties. We will write cP to denote scalar multiplication, where c ∈ Z * n . The security of the protocols discussed next is linked to the following problems, whose solution is assumed to be difficult to compute in polynomial time:
Definition 2 Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDHP)
Given P, aP, bP ∈ G, for some unknown a, b ∈ Z * n , find abP ∈ G.
In the following we will apply hash functions and signature schemes to lists of several arguments. In such cases, we are going to write function arguments separated by commas, e.g., example H(X,Y, Z). By doing so, we assume that we have a collision-free encoding which maps lists of arguments to binary strings, and that the parties' identities are arbitrary binary strings.
An entity, sayÂ , participating in a protocol is assigned a static key pair (a, A) which consists of a public and a private key. Public keys (denoted by upper case letters) are elements of G, while private keys (denoted by the corresponding lower case letters) are elements of Z * n . For example, the private key a may correspond to the public key A = aP.
Public keys are registered with a trusted directory, called the certificate authority (CA). The CA registers arbitrary keys with the restriction that no party can have more than one registered public key. We assume that all honest parties have a priori generated their public keys and have registered them with the CA, so that they can be known to and verified by other parties during protocol execution. Table 1 lists the notation used throughout the paper. 
ONE -PASS PROTOCOLS
In a one-pass AK protocol it is possible for entitiesÂ andB to agree upon a session key after a single message having been sent fromÂ toB, ifÂ has an authenticated copy ofB's static public key. A two-pass protocol can be converted to one-pass simply by replacingB's ephemeral public key with his static public key (Blake-Wilson et al., 1997) . In this Section we use precisely this technique create one-pass versions of the following protocols (described in Tables (2 -7) respectively):
• The Unified Model, proposed by Ankney, Johnson and Matyas (Ankney et al., 1995) ; it is an AK protocol in the draft standards ANSI X9.42 (ANSI-X9.42, 1998), ANSI X9.63 (ANSI-X9.63, 1998), and IEEE P1363 (IEEE-1363 (IEEE- , 1998 ).
• The Key Exchange Algorithm (KEA) designed by the National Security Agency and declassified in 1998 (NIST, 1998) . KEA is the key agreement protocol in the FORTEZZA suite of cryptographic algorithms designed by NSA in 1994 and it is similar to the Goss (Goss, 1990) and MTI/A0 (Matsumoto et al., 1986) protocols.
• The KEA+ protocol proposed by (Lauter and Mityagin, 2001 ); a modified version of the KEA protocol, which satisfies stronger security requirements than simple KEA for authenticated keyexchange.
• The MQV protocol (Law et al., 1998) that is in the draft standards ANSI X9.42 (ANSI-X9.42, 1998), ANSI X9.63 (ANSI-X9.63, 1998), and IEEE P1363 (IEEE-1363 (IEEE- , 1998 . MQV was proposed by NSA as the standard key exchange protocol for the US government.
• The HMQV protocol by (Krawczyk, 2005; Menezes, 2005) that was proposed as an alternative of MQV. In particular, there are two one-pass variants, namely HMQV(1) and HMQV(2). The two are quite similar; HMQV(2) was proposed for compatibility reasons (with the others x-round variants of HMQV).
For each protocol, we assume that two entities, say Bob and Alice, own a static key pair, the public part of which is presumed to be known and verified by the other party. Alice generates an ephemeral key pair (r, R) and sends the ephemeral public key, R, to Bob, along with her identityÂ. Afterward, they compute a session key which can be shown to be the same for the both of them. H(aB, rB,Â,B) sk B = H(bA, bR,Â,B) 
KEY-COMPROMISE IMPERSONATION ATTACKS
Obviously, if a private key is compromised then the attacker can impersonate the "corrupted" party to other entities, because entities are identified precisely by their private key. This kind of impersonation attack cannot be prevented in any of the existing public key cryptographic schemes. Instead, by "resistance to key-compromise impersonation (K-CI) attacks", we will understand the property of a protocol whereby if one party's long-term private key is somehow disclosed to an adversary, then that adversary will not be (Krawczyk, 2005) , mentions that protocols which use long-term static Diffie-Hellman keys g a , g b to derive a session key g ab (as all of the one-pass protocols examined here do) are insecure against K-CI attacks, but does not elaborate further. Before describing any attacks, we briefly mention some of the applications for which the use of one-pass protocols has been proposed (Oh et al., 2003) , and the consequences of a K-CI attack in each setting.
CONSEQUENCES OF K-CI VULNERABILITY
The major danger with K-CI is that an adversary can possibly gain much more knowledge than by simply having access to past or future conversations of an entity. Obviously, with knowledge of a party's private key, an attacker can eavesdrop and decrypt past or future conversations of that party 2 . Besides eavesdropping, however, a KC-I attacker would also be able to actively elicit additional information that may never have been communicated otherwise, by pretending to be a trusted entity to the victim (e.g., the attacker steals one's private key and then is able to pretend to be their lawyer or business associate).
E-mail
In an e-mail system one may wish to send encrypted messages by only using their own public information, such as name or e-mail address. Because one party may be temporarily off-line, e-mail communication resembles a one-way channel, and thus an one-pass AK protocol might be suitable in order to send a message without additional communication overload (Oh et al., 2003) . All modern onepass schemes provide assurance that no user other than the receiver will be able to compute the value of the shared secret key, as long as users remain uncorrupted. However, the vast number of e-mail users combined with the extensive presence of malicious software, makes it likely that private keys stored on personal computers (e.g., in conventional memory) can be compromised. Examples of serious K-CI consequences include the impersonation of a government entity or victims's lawyer to obtain information, and the impersonation of a stockbroker's clients and viceversa.
E-Commerce
For transactions held exclusively in cyberspace, one needs a key agreement protocol that offers authentication of the sender's identity. Furthermore, as the session key must be changed in every session, a protocol must provide both implicit key authentication and key freshness. One-pass AK protocols meet both of these requirements, and have been proposed as a possible mechanism for secure e-shopping. The consequences of a K-CI attack on an on-line transaction might include an adversary, say Eve, impersonating an on-line shop to a client whose private key she has obtained, and asking for personal or credit information.
Mobile Transactions
In wireless communications, such as wireless e-commerce, the authentication of a user is a very important issue, since its physical location changes frequently. Moreover, the computational power of a mobile device is likely to be limited. In light of these considerations, one-pass AK protocols have been proposed as a possible solution in wireless environments, because of their low communication overhead. As with K-CI attacks on e-commerce applications, an adversary can cause the disclosure of confidential data from the victims. Moreover, in cases where the attacker impersonates the wireless connection server, victims may be connected on an unauthorized network, and thus their (mobile) computer may be corrupted further.
K-CI Attacks
We will distinguish between two types of K-CI attacks, defined below.
Type-1
All existing one-pass AK establishment protocols are open to the general K-CI attack, in which an intruder, Eve, masquerades as a different entity and tries to establish a valid session key with the compromised party, Bob. There is no need for eavesdropping in this case: Eve, knowing Bob's private key, can initiate a new session with him by creating and sending an ephemeral public key, R, pretending to be another honest entity, Alice. In that case, Eve can compute the same session key as Bob, who is convinced that the key is shared with Alice. The attack is illustrated in Table 8 . Its success is based on the fact that none of the one-pass approaches mentioned here includes a sender verification mechanism. For instance, an exponential challenge-response (XCR) signature (from a player A to a player B), used in the HMQV protocol (Krawczyk, 2005) , can also be constructed by anyone who has knowledge of the recipient's private key. This means that if an attacker has knowledge of B's private key, he is able to create a signature of this type and thus impersonate A to B. Table 8 : Type-1 K-CI attack on HMQV(1).
Eve knows b, B, A
Bob (b, B) A possible solution to the Type-1 K-CI attack would be to have the sender transmit their digital signature on her ephemeral public key (see Table 9 ). Then, the receiver would be able to verify the signature before accepting the key (and the sender's identity). We stress the importance of including the recipient's identity,B, in the signed message to avoid the possibility of an attacker impersonating A by reusing A's signature from a protocol run between A and a different entity. The procedure described above does not protect against replay attacks. One way to reduce, but do not eliminate, the replay vulnerability, is to have parties append time-stamps to their messages 3 . More specifically, B can examine the timestamp T sent by the protocol initiator, A, and terminate the protocol if "too much" time has elapsed since T . Of course, this requires synchronization of A's and B's clocks, to within some reasonable tolerance. Depending on the statistics of the transmission delay imposed by the communication channel, an entity can set a time threshold that leaves a potential attacker little time to mount a replay attack. If A's and B's clocks are perfectly synchronized and the transmission delay is known with certainty, then the time left for an attack could be made arbitrarily small. The question of what is an acceptable time threshold will generally be application-dependent, and will not be discussed further here. Finally, one could also claim that signing every message involving the shared key could be a possible solution to Type-1 K-CI attacks, however, the additional communication/computational cost would be very high.
Remark: We have not included a formal proof of security against Type-1 K-CI attacks for the fix proposed in this Section. Such proof could be constructed based on the enhanced Canneti-Krawczyk model in (Zhu et al., 2005) , where in addition to the typical queries an adversary can make, one introduces a new query called key compromise. When an adversary issues this query for a specified party, B, the adversary learns B's long-term secret, b, but no other internal information. The key compromise query is different from the weaker type of party corruption query described in (Bellare et al., 2000; Katz et al., 2002) under their "weak-corruption" model, because a party may be uncorrupted while compromised. Furthermore, because in our case there is a single data flow, one can easily show that a successful Type-1 K-CI attack against the protocol in Tab. 4.2.1, for example, implies that the adversary has defeated the digital signature scheme under the assumptions made on the time-stamps T .
Type-2
There is a special K-CI attack that apparently succeeds with all one-flow protocols. It is illustrated in Table 10 . An intruder, Eve, that learns Bob's secret key and then eavesdrops on a single message from Alice (the initiator of the protocol) to Bob, would then be able to compute the current session key and thus impersonate Alice (but no one else) to Bob, and only for the current session. To achieve this, after Eve intercepts Alice's ephemeral public key, R, she computes the session key in the same way as Bob, and then must "cut out" Alice from the current conversation. There is no apparent solution for this attack, even if a scheme is to be equipped with digital signatures or time-stamps, or both. However, the Type-2 attack is rather limited compared with the general K-CI attack in which the intruder can impersonate any entity and at any time.
Conclusions
In this paper we have examined the resistance of the most efficient one-pass asymmetric AK establishment protocols to K-CI attacks. The use of one-pass protocols is unavoidable in settings where the communication channel is one-way (e.g., e-mail, storeand-forward applications) or in cases where computational and communication cost is to be minimized (e.g., low-power mobile applications). We distinguished between two types of K-CI threats. Unfortunately, due to their similarities, none of the protocols examined here are resistant to either K-CI attack. However, their security against Type-1 K-CI attacks can be somewhat improved with the help of standard digital signatures and time-stamps, at a significant additional communication and computational cost.
Although forward secrecy (another harmful threat related to party corruption) is usually considered more important than K-CI, our discussion suggests that a K-CI attack can be more dangerous: in widely-used applications, such as e-mail, mobile and e-business transactions, the security practices of the average user are likely to be lax (making key-compromise a real possibility) while at the same time a K-CI adversary can ask for and obtain information that would have not been transmitted otherwise. For this reason, the use of one-pass protocols should be avoided when possible.
